Introduction

Sex and violence: the eighteenth century, no less than the twentieth, was fascinated by these aspects of human nature. Yet in these pre-television days, the source of such entertainment was naturally different: sensational accounts of trials, particularly those concerning adultery, bigamy, homosexuality and murder, were popular reading and trials of all kinds attracted spectators from a wide social spectrum.

Eighteenth-century people were fascinated by law on a public and a personal level, showing detailed awareness of marriage, divorce and inheritance law, as well as the criminal code. This fascination is inevitably reflected in contemporary writing, which is steeped in the discourses of law.

In spite of this, the law and its processes have been largely neglected by twentieth-century commentators. This has been a neglect not of the law's presence as socio-historical background or as philosophical or ideological construct but as an institution which controlled every aspect of people's lives.

In particular, commentary has failed to show how eighteenth-century fiction, by both men and women, traced the manifold difficulties women encountered under the law and its administration; and more particularly still, how detailed and precise was women's understanding of the predicaments in which the law could place them. And yet these things had a profound effect on the practise of imaginative narrative throughout the century and beyond.

This study seeks to interpret legal discourse and practice from a literary perspective, clarifying aspects of legal history which have been largely ignored or misunderstood and which have led to difficulties in interpreting eighteenth-century fiction. The study reveals that fictional predicaments that have been taken as romantic or melodramatic, are often grounded in the precise, actual practices of eighteenth-century law.

Parker comments: 'One of the weaknesses that I see in feminist and historical analyses of the family is an understandable reluctance to treat with legal detail'.[i] His discussion of marriage laws is punctuated by literary references, which are used as alternative but valid social documentation. This study reverses the process, using legal detail to elucidate fiction, but it also attempts to redress the lack of critical work on the legal context which Parker identifies in historical studies but which is more evident in literary criticism. This study regards law as both historical context and, more importantly, as literary tool.

One problem which arises when discussing eighteenth-century law is that there were in fact three legal systems running parallel: canon or ecclesiastical law, common law and Equity. Canon law was based on Roman civil and canon law and was administered by the ecclesiastical courts. It had jurisdiction over matrimonial causes and cases of probate of wills. Court proceedings depended upon written documents and private interrogation of witnesses by professional examiners. Cases were decided by Judges, not juries.

Common law originated in Medieval times and evolved from feudal law and local customs, as interpreted by royal Judges and local magistrates and amended periodically by Parliament. As the name suggests, it was common to all England. It originally dealt simply with tangible property. Civil proceedings, called 'actions' began with plaintiffs applying for writs to remedy specific grievances. Evidence was given orally in court and the verdict was usually given by a jury.

Equity also originated in Medieval times and was created to afford relief to suitors whose cases were beyond the scope of common law. In the eighteenth century Equity's jurisdiction expanded, particularly in the area of property unprotected by common law, for example money and property held in trust. Equity was administered exclusively by Chancery, which dealt with the estates of intestates and the guardianship of minors, lunatics and women. Civil proceedings, called 'suits', began with a plaintiff setting forth the grievance. Evidence in court was in the form of written depositions and verdicts were reached by a Judge.

Twentieth-century readers may not readily come to terms with a legal system comprising three largely autonomous systems, with different regulations. Eighteenth-century writers

automatically distinguish between 'actions' and 'suits' and contemporary readers would have been aware of the general nature of the different courts.

One of the most important blind spots in literary criticism concerns the legal knowledge of eighteenth-century readers. It was fashionable for young gentlemen to have chambers at the Inns of Court, regardless of whether or not they intended to study law. Court proceedings, whether at the county assizes or Westminster itself, attracted a great deal of interest. Congreve refers to such interest, particularly in adultery trials, through Lady Wishfort in *The Way of the World* (1700). She criticises the 'young revellers of the Temple [who] take notes' at adultery trials 'and after talk it over again in Commons, or before drawers in an eating-house.' Mrs Marwood explains that the notes 'must after this be consigned by the shorthand writers to the public press; and from thence be transferred to the hands...of hawkers...you must hear nothing else for some days'(V,sc.v).

Jones explains: 'spectators attended to hear the causes of their friends tried, and old prints show us fashionably dressed ladies and gentlemen scattered about [Westminster] Hall...having looked in there apparently as part of the social round'. Such spectacles were not only available to the upper classes: 'While gentlemen of fashion amused themselves by attending the Courts, it was the custom for their servants to spend their time at the inferior Courts'.[ii] With such detail in mind, it is not surprising that eighteenth-century writers expected their readers to be familiar with law: it was fashionable entertainment. Fielding may be flattering his readers' legal knowledge in *Tom Jones* (1749): 'a short Reflection on the Wisdom of our Law...which those will like best who understand [it] most'.[iii]

If one reads transcripts of eighteenth-century trials, it is easy to see why they could have been deemed entertaining. What is perhaps surprising is that fictional presentations of legal predicaments and court scenes read rather like real court transcripts. This would be an unremarkable comment to make of twentieth-century 'realist' fiction but the realism of minor eighteenth-century fiction in this area appears to have passed without critical comment.

The term 'fictions of law' would appear to comprise two mutually exclusive concepts. Yet the line between legal and fictional discourse is not always as evident as one would expect. Passages from eighteenth-century court transcripts, in terms of both 'plot' detail and language, are at times oddly reminiscent of novels. The narratives of witnesses are often positively entertaining, giving all manner of colourful but irrelevant circumstantial detail and revelling in scandalous or violent detail.[iv]

The crim.con. case brought by the Duke of Norfolk against John Germaine in 1692, culminating in a divorce from the Duchess in 1700, was one of the most sensational and popular trials of the period. It was reported with eager attention to every scandalous detail in a manner which would draw blushes from all but the hardiest twentieth-century tabloid journalists and followed by the public as zealously as many soap operas are today; indeed, it had all the same ingredients.

The Duke first sought a divorce on grounds of adultery. His wife petitioned the court, using language reminiscent of fictional heroines discoursing on virtue: 'Her person, estate, and honour, which is more dear to her than her life, being now brought in question'. The servants and their narratives would not be out of place in a novel. Rowland Owen, a servant testifying against the Duchess, relates: 'the lodgings being open, he saw Mr Germaine in bed with the duchess of Norfolk, the duchess leaped out of the bed, and put on a morning gown and Germaine hid himself in bed'. Margaret Ellwood, another servant, testifies that 'She opened the door, saw my lady upon the stools in an ill posture, Mr Germaine's breeches were down; he pulled them up, and laid his hand on his sword, saying, 'God damn you for a whore, how have you the impudence to come here?' My lady bid him kick me down; he scattered some concerns, that is, man's nature, on the boards...Another time, she saw Mr Cornwal let Mr Germaine out of my lady's closet; she saw Germaine's legs within her's...and his breeches were about his heels'.[v]

The bill for divorce was denied because the Duke had not yet obtained a conviction for crim.con. The Duke subsequently brought an action for crim.con., which attracted as much attention as the earlier divorce proceedings. Margaret Ellwood amusingly describes spying on her mistress: 'I

opened the drawing-room door, and looked through the key-hole of the other door where they was, and saw them go to bed'. She is asked, 'Had they no curtains?' but replies shamelessly, 'Yes, my lord, they had; though they were drawn on both sides the bed, they left them open at the foot'(p.930). Howell notes Kennet's comment on the Norfolk crim.con. case: 'During this session the town was entertained with the trial of an indecent cause in Westminster-hall...and upon a full hearing of many obscene evidences, the jury found for the plaintiff' but 'the slightness of satisfaction' in terms of damages 'was almost as great a reproach as the crime itself'. Howell notes, 'it appears they examined witnesses, heard counsel, and then flung out the bill. However, in 1700 his Grace obtained an act of parliament for a divorce, and the duchess afterwards married Sir John Germaine'(p.948).

In 1702, Haagen Swendsen was tried for the abduction and forcible marriage of the orphaned heiress Pleasant Rawlins. The court transcript unfolds a tale worthy of a novelistic plot. Mrs Baynton, Swendsen's confederate, 'pass[es] for a country gentlewoman' in order to obtain lodgings at Mrs Nightingale's, where Rawlins is staying with her guardian's sister. Baynton, like Richardson's Lovelace's helpers, who pretend to be his cousins, 'seemed to live a virtuous life, that she might ingratiate herself'(XIV,p.562). We are given her fabricated 'history' just as one would expect in a novel.

Much of the detail we are given is not really relevant to the trial: 'he had but a puny paunch'; 'you have an extraordinary hand at making punch'(XVI,p.566). They bring a writ for debt against Rawlins, as Mrs Sinclair does to Richardson's Clarissa. Rawlins, like Clarissa, 'was forcibly carried to...the bailiff's house'(p.562). The language is dramatic, with Busby crying 'Murder! murder!' and she and Rawlins asserting they 'would die together'(p.569) in a manner worthy of fictional heroines. Baynton pretends to be concerned, commenting, 'her last hopes was her dear brother' who, 'she doubted not...would bail her'(p.562). Baynton tells Rawlins, 'if you were married, that would put an end to the action'(p.564) because husbands were responsible for wives' debts. Rawlins is thus tricked into marrying a penniless man. She explains, 'I was forced to marry [Swendsen] out of fear...of being murdered'(p.576). The jury judged him to be guilty.

Duellists' trials provide detailed and violent accounts of duels: novelists' interest in the detail of wounds, for example in *Roderick Random* (1748), may in part reflect the gory details given in court. In 1765 Lord Byron was tried for murder after a duel with William Chaworth. We are told that Byron 'of his malice aforethought, did strike, thrust, stab, and penetrate, giving to the said William Chaworth...upon the said left side of the belly...near the navel...one mortal wound, of the depth of six inches, and of the breadth of half an inch'(XIX,p.1181). The Attorney General recounts that when Stevenson was served with a writ for debt, he 'presented a pistol at the breast of the officer, and swore, if he did not immediately leave...he would blow his brains out...Resolved upon the death of somebody or other, no matter whom, he took up a gun...and discharged it through the door'(p.849), killing Elcock.

Lord Ferrers was convicted of murder after a duel in 1760. The account of his execution, given after that of the trial, is detailed and dramatic: 'The executioner then proceeded to do his duty, to which his lordship, with great resignation, submitted...his arms secured by a black sash...he advanced' to 'the middle of the scaffold...and standing under the cross-beam...he asked the executioner, Am I right? - Then the cap was drawn over his face...that part upon which he stood, instantly sunk...For a few seconds his lordship made some struggles against the attacks of death, but was soon eased of all pain by the pressure of the executioner'(XIX,p.978).

Howell provides horrific detail coldly, as one might expect in a factual account: 'the coffin was raised up' and 'conveyed...to Surgeons-Hall, to undergo the rest of the sentence (viz. dissection)'(p.979), explaining points of law in footnotes. However, acting rather like a narrator, he explains, 'From the time of his lordship's ascending upon the scaffold, until his execution, was about eight minutes; during which his countenance did not change, nor his tongue falter'(pp.978-9).

We are not simply given an account of the facts but an indication as to the atmosphere and the mood of the crowd: 'his behaviour...created a most awful and respectful silence amidst the numberless spectators'. Howell comments, '[it] cannot but make a sensible impression upon every

humane breast'(p.979), seemingly directing his readers' emotions, which may seem strange for an editor of a collection of trials but which is appropriate given public interest in the characters and fates of well known felons, particularly aristocrats such as Ferrers. Such men were the media 'stars' of their age.

Howell comments on trial by eighteenth-century 'media' with reference to the trial of Mary Squires and Susannah Wells for assault on Mary Canning, who was accused of fabricating the story: 'Sir Crisp's Address, and Canning's friends' Refutation...make two large folio pamphlets; and the many other pamphlets published on both sides...are too numerous to insert here'(XIX,p.276). Such accounts provide an interesting perspective on fictional narratives concerning execution, for example Fielding's *Jonathan Wild* (1743).

Law is self-evident in the work of Henry Fielding but its very obviousness can hide many of the more subtle criticisms and challenges to law, which only become apparent when one approaches the texts with specific legal knowledge, as many contemporary readers would have done. Fielding's dual interests in law and writing are clear. His writing carries the authority of one trained professionally in law but it must be stressed that his work is not unusual in its legal concerns: rather, he exploits a topic which was already popular in fiction, capitalising on his legal knowledge. What is perhaps surprising to twentieth-century commentators is that other writers, both male and female, who were not trained in law, not only show a profound awareness of it but also evince a detailed knowledge of it.

In the absence of recent critical debate concerning eighteenth-century women writers and their use of law or their rôle in the development of what we know as realism, I draw on the work of earlier commentators, much of whose work in this area has remained unchallenged. Their work is considered partly for the light it sheds on eighteenth-century fiction but also as an example of critical attitudes and practices which are still apparent today and which need to be challenged. Feminist commentators such as Dale Spender have opened the debate concerning the work of minor female novelists. I seek to stimulate debate by expanding the critical focus to encompass law, raising new questions concerning the nature and value of eighteenth-century women's writing and seeking to provide an insight into the concerns of both male and female writers and their readers.

Despite writing some years ago, Tompkins typifies critical attitudes throughout the twentieth century towards eighteenth-century women writers. She recognises that 'A strong satiric vein runs through' what she refers to as 'the domestic novel' but fails to take it seriously, arguing that women were satirising 'the stupidities...selfishness and...conceit with which for centuries their sex had been affronted', continuing deprecatingly, 'where their fastidiousness is offended they punish without mercy'.[vi] Women writers did indeed satirise male fops and boors but their concerns were far wider and more serious; it is not their 'fastidiousness' which is at issue but rational anger concerning legal inequities. Tompkins's comments indicate a lack of awareness and respect for the detailed and knowledgeable critiques of law to be found in the very works she dismisses.

Tompkins argues that 'the administration of justice [is] hardly to be found' in novels 'except as [it] serve[s] the comic purposes of the picaresque'(pp.68-9). Yet it reveals itself to be an important concern throughout the century, not simply in Defoe and Fielding, but in Aubin, Haywood and Frances Sheridan, right through to the Gothic novelists. Legal practices are of course used for comic purposes but to argue that they are always subservient to comedy is a gross simplification which ignores the serious legal critique.

The terms of critical commentary do not appear to have advanced substantially: despite more perceptive treatment of the relation between romance and realism, more recent commentary reveals similar critical prejudice. Little critical attention has been paid to the writings of what Richetti refers to as 'justly neglected spirits' such as Aubin and Haywood. Those studies which do exist tend to concentrate on 'the thin righteousness of...Mrs Haywood' and 'the strenuously pious efforts of Mrs Aubin' which, according to Richetti and doubtless many others who do not even consider them in their work, 'provoke little more than bemused wonder at the taste of the age'.[vii]

Richetti argues contemptuously, 'The hysterical romantic fustian of...Mrs Haywood, and other lady novelists is clearly unreadable'(p.267). The term 'lady novelists' indicates something

approaching the dismissive attitude towards women novelists current in the eighteenth century but which one would hope not to see in the twentieth. Comments such as: 'The incompetence at realistic narration of the sorry hacks and well-meaning ladies who produced this fiction is thus not really an issue', appear to exculpate women writers for poor writing but they in fact draw attention to it. He argues that 'the narratives they wrote were geared to well-known narrative [and moral] clichés'(p.264), as if they had failed to live up to literary standards which, as he himself notes, had yet to be established. Surprisingly, he does not seem to take seriously the 'realistic' comments that can be made through 'narrative clichés': the sexual trials he rightly sees as motifs to demonstrate heroines' moral strength in Aubin's novels, for example, also stand as a running implicit commentary on women's vulnerability under patriarchal law. Richetti fails to take account of the 'realistic' function of narrative myths.

Clara Reeve defined the novel in *Progress of Romance* (1785) as 'a picture of real life and manners, and of the times in which it is written'.[viii] Narrative conventions often dismissed as clichés are the 'pictures' which express the legal predicaments 'of real life'. Todd recognises that a narrative convention may be both allegorical and realistic: 'a woman might be in a madhouse not as metaphor and symbol...but because the laws of England allow her sometimes to be shut up by her husband'.[ix]

Richetti argues pertinently that popular narrative is useful because 'by extracting [its] ideological strategies'(p.263), we obtain 'the most prominent guide to the uses of fiction for its readers...a profound self-portrait of the age'(p.264). I would argue that law is a fundamental part of the 'ideological strategy' of popular narrative.

Spender argues that 'By the second half of the eighteenth century most of the women writers of serious fiction were concerned with ethical questions'.[x] Yet the same is clearly true of earlier writers such as Aubin and Haywood. The novel facilitated discussion and analysis of social and legal issues without becoming overt political debate. Women were particularly empowered by the genre because they could raise issues which they could not raise elsewhere.

Gilbert comments that what eighteenth-century women writers 'wrote may have seemed docile enough' but 'it was often covertly subversive, even volcanic, and almost always profoundly revisionary'. She argues that 'women writers have frequently responded to sociocultural constraints by creating symbolic narratives that express their common feelings of constriction, exclusion, dispossession'.[xi] All these problems are rooted in law.

It is hardly surprising that women writers should have wished to address the law in their work: the very foundations of English law often did not apply to women in practice. Blackstone comments that 'laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty', making the assumption that English laws are 'prudently framed', but the evidence of most eighteenth-century fiction is that women did not share this confidence and dissented from aspects of law which constrained them.[xii]

Blackstone explains that every man has 'the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property'. He defines 'personal security' as 'a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life'(I,p.129), health and reputation. We may assume that this applies, at least in theory, to both men and women. However, if single and under twenty one or if married, a woman's 'uninterrupted enjoyment of...life' depended on her father or husband respectively.

Blackstone defines 'personal liberty' as the right of 'removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law'(I,p.134). Twentieth-century readers may nonchalantly regard this as a basic right but for eighteenth-century women it was a right which only existed in theory, since women generally needed their parents' or husbands' permission in order to travel and they could legally be effectively imprisoned by fathers and husbands.

Blackstone confidently asserts yet another right which, in practice, was often denied to women: the right of 'property' or 'the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [one's] acquisitions, without any control'(I,p.138), a right only enjoyed by women who were legally independent, that is, single women over twenty one and widows, who still had to rely on male bankers. Interestingly,

when Blackstone explains basic legal rights, he refers only to men. For example, 'applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries' is a 'right of every Englishman'(I,p.141). One would assume that such a right would apply to everyone, regardless of gender. Yet if a woman was attacked she could only seek redress through her father or husband, unless she was legally independent, a comparatively rare position.

Thus we see that the very basic rights of personal security, liberty, property and redress of injuries, used by Blackstone to argue that English law protected people's interests, often excluded women in practice. This would explain women writers' consciousness of the law and its limitations. Watt is dismissive of women's rôle within the development of the novel: 'the dominance of women readers...is connected with the characteristic kind of weakness and unreality to which the [novel] is liable - its tendency to restrict the field...to a small and arbitrary selection of human situations'.[xiii] He appears not to have read Woolf, who wrote in 1929: 'When a woman comes to write a novel, she will find that she is perpetually wishing to alter the established values - to make serious what appears insignificant to a man, and trivial what is to him important'. She argued that a male commentator would 'be genuinely puzzled' and would see 'not merely a difference of view, but a view that is weak or trivial, or sentimental, because it differs from his own'.[xiv] It is perhaps for this reason that so many eighteenth-century women's novels have been dismissed as 'trivial' or 'sentimental' when in fact they were confronting serious issues.

It is worth remembering that despite a rise in middle class female literacy during the eighteenth century, the majority of the reading population was male. Few women could afford to buy or subscribe to novels and the circulating libraries did not emerge until the 1740s. However, women formed a growing and increasingly influential reading public, which turned to novels for pleasure but also for discussion of issues which interested them and which reflected their daily concerns; hence the rise of the feminocentric novel.[xv]

In women's novels, women were presented with hitherto unknown access not only to ideas which may have been new to them, but with an informed feminine perspective on issues which they would have been taught to regard as beyond their sphere, for example law and finance. Women would have had a general awareness of law because trials, for example the local Quarter Sessions, were discussed in a variety of arenas, from pamphlets to taverns and people's homes. Yet women were not educated about the law in the way most men of any social consequence were. Men from the upper classes were brought up with the knowledge that they would play an active part in law, probably serving as Justices. Women, on the other hand, were taught that law was both decided and executed by men and thus they could have no executive rôle. In discussing seriously aspects of the law, women's novels reject this gendering of the legislature.

Novelists such as Haywood, Sheridan and later Wollstonecraft not only reveal equal interest in law with male writers; they evince detailed knowledge of it. We can only surmise how they acquired specific legal knowledge: books, attending trials, discussions with brothers or husbands. Yet we must not underestimate the importance of their efforts to understand and to question the laws under which they were forced to live. Their novels presuppose an interest in law on the part of their presumably largely female readership. It would be interesting to surmise the effect that their work might have had on the men who also read 'women's' novels.

Part of the function of eighteenth-century women's novels is undoubtedly to entertain, providing fantasy as escape from reality, be it in terms of love and romance or empowered heroines behaving in ways ordinary women felt they could not. Yet another important function appears to be as a means of sharing concerns regarding law, suggesting ways forward, questioning the legal and thus the social status quo, and perhaps clarifying points of law, for example, rights concerning choice of marriage partner, precontract, inheritance rights and even separation and divorce laws. Eighteenth-century novelists varied in terms of character and style but together, they established the rôle of law as a novelistic tool to engage readers' interest but also the rôle of fiction as legal critique.

[i] S.Parker, *Informal Marriage, Cohabitation and the Law, 1750-1989*, London: Macmillan, 1990, p.7.

[ii] B.Jones, *Henry Fielding: Novelist and Magistrate*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1933, pp.32-3.

[iii] H.Fielding, *Tom Jones* (1749), edited by R.Mutter, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985, p.104.

[iv] See Wagner's useful discussion, 'Trial Reports as a Genre of Eighteenth-Century Erotica', *British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Studies*, V, no.1, Spring 1982, pp.117-121 (p.117). Stone notes the different kinds of legal publications, making the important distinction between transcripts written for lawyers and unashamedly salacious versions of court events, L.Stone, *Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp.248-253. See also W.Holdsworth, *A History of English Law*, 17 vols, London: Methuen, 1938, XII,pp.102-3,110-15,130-46; J.Lüsebrink, 'Les Crimes Sexuels dans les "causes célèbres"', *Le XVIIIème* siècle, XII (1980); P.Wagner, 'The Pornographer in the Courtroom: Trial Reports about Cases of Sexual Crimes and Delinquencies as a Genre of Eighteenth-Century Erotics', in *Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, edited by P.G.Boucé, pp.120-40.

[v] *State Trials*, edited and compiled by T.B.Howell and T.J.Howell, 33 vols, London, 1809-26, XII,pp.889,897,903-4. References to court transcripts in the following pages are also taken from the *State Trials*, which organised exisiting material from other editors in order to provide one of the most authoritative and coherent accounts of judicial proceedings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

[vi] J.M.S.Tompkins, *The Popular Novel in England: 1770-1800*, London: Constable, 1932, pp.131-2.

[vii] J.J.Richetti, *Popular Fiction Before Richardson: Narrative Patterns, 1700-1739*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, p.262.

[viii] C.Reeve, *The Progress of Romance* (1785), The Facsimile Text Society, Series 1, vol.4, New York, 1930, II,p.111.

[ix] J.Todd, *The Sign of Angellica: Woman, Writing and Fiction, 1660-1800*, London: Virago, 1989, p.7.

[x] D.Spender, *Mothers of the Novel: 100 good women writers before Jane Austen*, London: Pandora, 1986, p.2.

[xi] S.M.Gilbert, 'What Do Feminist Critics want?'. In *The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Woman, Literature and Theory*, edited by E.Showalter, London: Virago, 1986, p.35.

[xii] Sir W.Blackstone, *Commentaries On The Laws Of England* (1753), sixth edition, 4 vols, Dublin, 1775, I,p.126.

[xiii] I.Watt, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding*, London: Chatto and Windus, 1963, p.311.

[xiv] V.Woolf, *Collected Essays*, edited by Leonard Woolf, London: Chatto and Windus, 1972, II,p.146.

[xv] See in particular discussions in *The New Feminist Criticism*, edited by E.Showalter; J.Spencer, *The Rise of the Woman Novelist: From Aphra Behn to Jane Austen*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; D.Spender, *Mothers of the Novel*.